restoring our biblical and constitutional foundations
A War Lesson from First Manassas
On July 16, 1861, the army of Union General Irvin McDowell left its fortified camps along the Potomac and drove in the advance of Confederate General Beauregard from Fairfax Courthouse on the 17th.
The Federal Army consisted of 60 pieces of rifled artillery and 60,000 men, including nearly all the United States regulars east of the Rockies. It was equipped with all that money could buy and armed with the latest implements of destruction.
Both the Northern army and people alike were inflated with the assurance of victory. Supply packages were labeled For Richmond. Lincolns volunteers had stuffed their haversacks with ropes with which to hang the Southern Rebels as soon as they were captured in battle. The Federal Congress, then in session in Washington City, was adjourned to allow its members to accompany the army and witness the spectacle of a Confederate rout. Long lines of civilian carriages, filled with Washingtons finest in holiday attire, followed the army with baskets of champagne.
Northern newspapers mocked with disdain any idea of defeat and declared that, in ten days or a month at the most, their triumphant troops would establish themselves in Richmond. The Tribune said: The hanging of traitors is sure to begin before the month is over. The nations of Europe may rest assured that Jeff. Davis & Co. will be swinging from the battlements of Washington, at least by the 4th of July. We spit upon a later and longer deferred justice.
The New York Times commented: Let us make quick work. The rebellion, as some people designate it, is an unborn tadpole. Let us not fall into the delusion of mistaking a local commotion for a revolution. A strong active pull together will do our work effectually in thirty days.
The Philadelphia Press declared that no man of sense could, for a moment, doubt that this much-ado-about-nothing would end in a month.
Few could imagine that only four days later, on Sunday, July 21, the first major battle of the Civil War would end in the complete and utter rout of the Union Army, with every soldier seeking the nearest crossing of the Bull Run. The Confederacy was saved from the immediate danger of invasion, and the federal Army was thrown into a panic as abject as its previous boasting had been arrogant. It was, indeed, an end to innocence.
Ten days into the Iraqi war, the optimistic assumptions of the Pentagons war planners have yet to be realized. Before the U.S. launched the war, military planners confidently predicted a rout: Iraqi troops would quickly surrender, Saddams rule would collapse, and the Iraqi people would welcome the U.S. and British troops as liberators.
Now, in the face of fierce resistance, U.S. commanders are conceding that the war is likely to be tougher and longer than anticipated. This is the ground war that was not going to happen in [Rumsfeld’s] plan, a Pentagon official said. Because the Pentagon didnt commit overwhelming force (as it did in the first Gulf War), now we have three divisions strung out over 300-plus miles and the follow-on division, our reserve, is probably three weeks away from landing.
Our force package is very light, said a retired senior general. If things dont happen exactly as you assumed, you get into a tangle, a mismatch of your strategy and your force. Things like the pockets [of Iraqi resistance] in Basra, Umm Qasr and Nasiriyah need to be dealt with forcefully, but we dont have the forces to do it.
John Collins, a retired Army colonel and former chief researcher for the Library of Congress, said the worst scenario would be sending U.S. troops to fight for Baghdad. He said every military commander since Sun Tzu, the ancient Chinese strategist, has hated urban warfare. Military casualties normally soar on both sides; innocent civilians lose lives and suffer severe privation; reconstruction costs skyrocket, Collins said, adding that fighting for the capital would cancel out the allied advantages in air and armor.
One thing is certain, however. U.S. expectations that this conflict would be a repeat of the First Gulf Warthat our troops would march in and everybody would surrender in four dayshave been dispelled. We were not expecting that kind of resistance from any of those towns, says Gen. Louis Weber of the 20,000-strong 3rd Infantry Division, which is spearheading the ground campaign. They dispersed the forces so we didnt get a clear picture of them moving in. It was pretty astute, he added.
Hindsight is always 20-. Talk of frightened Iraqi soldiers surrendering in droves was based more on hubris than sound military strategy. The overly optimistic assumptions made by administration officials, military planners, and their neocon cheerleaders have had a sudden collision with reality.
As the U.S. adjusts to the inevitable realities of war, the lesson of First Manassas is worth remembering: Never underestimate your enemy.
March 31, 2003
David Alan Black is the editor of www.daveblackonline.com.